

Russian propaganda operations against Hitler, which paralleled those from SHAEF; the material on this subject is so scanty, outside classified files, that an educated guess would be worth a great deal.) Four succeeding chapters take up policy-making, administrative organization, personnel, and intelligence. Coming to the meat of the matter, the sixth to eighth chapters survey the target audience ("the syke-war publics"), theme-making, and propaganda techniques; these are particularly valuable, because they put together a large amount of public-opinion doctrine and desperately-practical wartime experience. In themselves, they inch the whole field of public opinion studies a small but very important degree nearer experienceable and repeatable application to international problems. The closing chapters cover media, special operations (black propaganda and specific military missions), and an evaluation of the effectiveness of psychological warfare.

Careful as to fact, neat and clear in style, well-illustrated, the book suffers very slightly from the determined localism of the author. Lerner is resolved to deal only with SHAEF, and he does so; now and then the book reads like a military-unit history, which in turn may be described as an unfortunate cultural crossing between a high-school year book and a wartime souvenir. The illustrations show some leaflets in color, but they also show the perfectly human faces of the PWD staff. In bias, the author is a hearty pro-Roosevelt man who tries hard to state the other side clearly, but can't help dropping his voice slightly when he does so. His defense of "unconditional surrender" is a case in point (pp. 18-25), supplemented by Crossman's defense (pp. 323-346). His silence on the *actual* problem of our wartime

alliance with the Russian dictatorship against the German dictatorship, as opposed to the "problem" as an issue to be defended in propaganda, is also characteristic of a New Deal outlook on world affairs. But these wartime enthusiasms, which were so recently assets to his talent, cannot be judged as damaging the study as a whole. Last year's fashions always look silly, but grandma's fashions acquire period and charm. So, too, will it be with Rooseveltism. In a few years *Syke-war* will be all the more valuable precisely because it does preserve the hopes and prejudices of its time. In World War III, if it comes, men will have no excuse for failing to look up the greatest psychological warfare campaign of World War II. This book, like unimpeachable amber, preserves even a tiny sample of the rubbish for posterity; but meanwhile it sets a form for war-and-public-opinion studies which future writers will ignore only at their peril.

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*Out of the Crocodile's Mouth: Russian Cartoons about the United States from "Krokodil," Moscow's Humor Magazine.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949. 116 pp. \$2.50.

This book reproduces two-thirds of the cartoons on America published in *Krokodil* between the spring of 1946 and that of 1949. They contain much that is familiar. *Krokodil* has taken over many unfavorable points made about the United States before 1933 by Euro-

pean intellectuals and Socialists, and by American populists and radicals. The current exoteric Soviet image of America, as of most other aspects of the world, remains dominated by stereotypes of the twenties.

But within this framework a current Soviet anxiety finds expression: how strong is the United States? *Krokodil* offers a variety of images of the United States as Uncle Sam or as an American business man. (There are almost no presentations of opponents of Wall Street.) There is the enormous and dangerous America, towering in height and bulk, with a fat neck, huge jaws, protruding chin, bared teeth and cigar. The expression on the often asymmetrical face is brutal and malicious, and only rarely (e.g., p. 64) sanctimonious. But in another presentation decay is setting in: this still powerful figure is almost always old. He is apt to be bald, and the upper part of the head is undeveloped. Gluttony has made his trunk bloated and flabby. The "hysterical" movements associated with the Soviet image of a class passing through decline and fall (cf. pp. 23, 42) are too much for his limbs, which are atrophied. Decay leads to decrepitude. Then Uncle Sam is puny, shrivelled, bent. Body parts as well as clothes are out of shape, droop, or seem to be falling off—tie, beard, tongue, cigar, nose, ears, hair, hat (pp. 76, 104). Uncle Sam thus sinks to the status of John Bull—but Winston Churchill is able to dominate America (p. 104), which in another picture is eating the British lion and biting off more than it can chew (p. 100). In any one of these images, America may have facial features resembling those of Jews in anti-Semitic cartoons (pp. 13, 14, 23, 54, 91).

Major differences between the current Soviet image of the United States and previous hostile images of America seem to reflect aspects of the Soviet Union itself. *Krokodil* depicts a country whose elite prefers rather old-fashioned formal dress and wears opaque glasses to conceal facial expression (rather than using the Stalinist pipe). Statistics are falsified, elections are rigged, court decisions are directly manipulated by those in power, strikes are prevented by force, libraries are purged (p. 57), and the press does not mention the hardships of life (p. 76). Soldiers and officials abroad are apt to be "hooligans" (pp. 56, 57), and there is a habit of confiscating watches with the aid of guns (p. 62). There are two agencies (the FBI and the House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities) which arrest everybody who shows the slightest indication of potential non-conformism (pp. 44, 47). Any citizen can be severely punished if one or the other of these agencies decides to apply to him one of the ambiguous terms denoting categories of persons to be liquidated (p. 45). The penalties for common crimes are much milder than for political offenses (p. 50), and juvenile delinquents are treated with little regard for their age (p. 62). Scientists are apt to use their work as cover for intelligence work (p. 83), and assassinations may be performed under the guise of medical operations (p. 97). A substantial part of the labor force of the country works under arrest (p. 37), and it is always easy to increase this group (p. 46). A very small top group absolutely controls and abuses its helpless and servile agents within the country and its appendages outside of it (pp. 73, 90, 95, 98, 101,

112, 115). Human beings are used as tools; they are represented as parts of machines, or as replacing machines (pp. 79, 81, 82, 86, 97, 107).

The cartoons reproduced in this book are fairly representative of the image of the United States in current Soviet publications ranging from mass-circulation newspapers to professional periodicals. The fact that this image contains little besides reproductions of older stereotypes and reflections of Soviet reality is representative, too, of the low level of imaginative and intellectual productivity—in public—in the Soviet Union today.

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SELDES, GEORGE

*The People Don't Know.* New York: Gaer Associates, 1949. 342 pp. \$3.00.

This book is a political indictment of the American press. Its viewpoint can be stated as follows: Since 95.6 per cent of the American electorate in 1948 refused to be convinced by Mr. Wallace that the alliance between big money, big brass, big press, and *little* government was guiding the nation straight into World War III, it has become more than ever necessary to fix the blame upon the press, and to show how the press is responsible for the ignorance and misinformation of the American people. The indictment is not very precisely formulated, but may be boiled down to two counts: (1) the press has deliberately suppressed the true facts about American-Soviet relations and postwar world affairs, and (2) the press has systematically sought to prepare American public opinion for

World War III by presenting practically all foreign news in the context of the ideological conflict between Russian communism and the American free enterprise system.

To document these charges, Mr. Seldes packs the first 225 pages of his book with examples in which certain sections of the press have suppressed or distorted dispatches, resorted to war-scare and hate-propaganda headlines, "faked" rumor and nonsense as legitimate news, sent out home-office instructions as to the kind of stories wanted, given prominence to news analysts who emphasize the viewpoints that publishers and editors want played up, and have even published palpable falsehoods. The citizen who is dissatisfied with the kind of information he gets about foreign affairs from the papers can certainly find chapter-and-verse illustration here for his discontent. But the critical reader will look in vain for any standard of "truth, balance, or comprehensiveness" in the news from Mr. Seldes, who is fairly open to the charge that, for him, truth is a matter of faith, belief, opinion, or value. In his ken, the "facts" about press censorship and propaganda are wholly relative to the viewpoint expressed. This reviewer has not the slightest doubt that if only the beliefs and values held by Mr. Seldes were propagated by the press, his moral indignation would evaporate. By Seldes' *implicit* standard, his charges can be "proved" only by adopting his belief and value system as the criteria of truth. As this does not seem feasible, Seldes is content to point the finger of guilt. He makes no concrete suggestions for remedying the evils he complains of. In fact, he specifically says that every-